

**Getting Juvenile Justice Right in New York** ♦  
Proven Interventions Will Cut Crime and Save Money



# Acknowledgements

**Fight Crime: Invest in Kids New York** is a project of **Fight Crime: Invest in Kids**. **Fight Crime: Invest in Kids** is a national, bipartisan, nonprofit anti-crime organization. The national organization has a membership of more than 3,500 police chiefs, sheriffs, prosecutors, other law enforcement leaders and violence survivors. The members take a hard-nosed look at what works — and what doesn't work — to prevent crime and violence. They then recommend effective strategies to state and national policy-makers.

**Fight Crime: Invest in Kids** is supported by tax-deductible contributions from foundations, individuals and corporations. **FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS** receives no funds from federal, state or local governments.

Major funding is provided by:

The Atlantic Philanthropies • The Buffett Early Childhood Fund • The Butler Family Fund • Naomi & Nehemiah Cohen Foundation • Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation • The Horace Hagedorn Foundation • JEHT Foundation • The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation • The David and Lucile Packard Foundation • The William Penn Foundation • The Pew Charitable Trusts - Advancing Quality Pre-K for All

Funding for **Fight Crime: Invest in Kids New York** is provided by:

The Altman Foundation • Robert Sterling Clark Foundation • The Horace Hagedorn Foundation • Long Island Community Foundation • The Pinkerton Foundation • Rauch Foundation • The New York Community Trust

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# Getting Juvenile Justice Right in New York

## Proven Interventions Will Cut Crime and Save Money

The good news is that, nationally, **6 in 10 juveniles brought before a juvenile court for the first time will not return to court** on another charge. However, some youth come back repeatedly. Too many New York juveniles are well on their way to becoming chronic, violent criminals. One study looked at those New York juvenile delinquents whose crimes were serious enough or frequent enough that they had been placed in state custody. It found disturbing results: “For males and females combined, **75 percent were arrested [again] for a felony or misdemeanor**, and 42 percent were arrested for a violent felony.”

Nothing will make juvenile crime totally disappear. But research from Missouri, Ohio and elsewhere shows that, if fully implemented, **the reforms New York State is beginning to put in place can eliminate 4 out of 10 or more of the repeat crimes** now committed by juvenile delinquents.

### What the Research Shows

Research has identified several effective approaches that help young delinquents avoid committing additional crimes. Here’s what works:

#### 1. The most serious and troubled juveniles in custody need effective interventions to become productive citizens instead of career criminals.

Missouri found that by moving teens who need confinement from large, impersonal institutions to smaller facilities and helping them learn to control their anti-social behaviors, conviction rates within three years of release could be cut **40 percent below the rates experienced in New York State**.

In **Wisconsin**, seriously troubled juveniles who did not receive a specialized mental health intervention while in custody were **three times more likely than similar youths to commit violent crimes** when released.

**Chicago** found that, when its most dangerous violent offenders returned home to one high-crime area of the city after serving their sentences, a carrot-and-stick program helped **cut homicides in those neighborhoods by almost 40 percent**. This approach combines increased law enforcement supervision of the offenders, expedited return to custody if needed, and expedited access to jobs, substance abuse treatment or other services. The same approach has worked with juveniles in Boston, Philadelphia and many other cities.

#### 2. Use intensive foster care as an alternative to lock-up for less dangerous juveniles.

Many delinquents in custody who are not in high-security lock-up would re-offend less if placed in intensive foster care. Strict, specially-trained, foster parents ensure these medium-risk teens learn how to avoid criminal behavior while their parents are being trained to use the same methods to keep their children on track and away from crime when they leave foster care and return home. Research shows this approach can **cut new crimes in half**. There are currently 30 intensive foster care homes in the Bronx and 20 upstate. Hundreds more are needed.

### 3. Combine community sanctions with effective interventions as an alternative to out-of-home placement for many youth.

Many young delinquents committing serious or repeated crimes may not need placement outside the home. Along with the typical sanctions the courts are likely to impose on them, such as probation, curfews, and community service, if the troubled youth receive proven interventions, such as Cognitive Behavioral Therapy and Family Therapy, that effectively change their negative patterns of behavior the youth can be diverted from expensive custody and still commit fewer new crimes than if they are placed in custody. Those approaches, beginning to be used throughout New York, teach young people becoming involved in crime the social skills they need to sharply reduce further aggression, substance abuse or other criminal behavior.

### 4. Reduce pretrial detention for low-risk juveniles following arrest.

Data show that nationwide six out of 10 teens brought before courts are unlikely ever to return on new charges, yet many of them wind up being held in pretrial detention. ***One way to help finance effective interventions for juveniles who are more violent or chronic criminals is to reduce the unnecessary—and expensive—warehousing in pretrial detention of arrested young people who are not a high risk to their communities.*** This can be accomplished by using evidence-based screening tools coupled with alternative interventions. New York City and some upstate counties have already begun reforming how they handle children brought in for running away or other charges that would not be crimes if committed by adults.

### 5. Collect data and increase accountability.

Florida and Washington State systematically collect data on juvenile and adult repeat offending and use that data to increase accountability in their states. ***New York needs the legal framework and funding to support similar data collection and analysis so policymakers will have the information they need to replace failing approaches with effective efforts that cut crime.***

## Save Money by Cutting Crime

Analysis shows that research-based approaches for cutting juvenile aggression and substance abuse problems reduce current custody costs and future crime so much they can save an average of \$15,000 to \$75,000 per delinquent. RECLAIM Ohio redirected moderate-risk juvenile delinquents to community sanctions and interventions. Those left out of the interventions offended 5 times more often, costing on average \$47,000 more per delinquent. New York City reported that, in 2005, its initial efforts to redirect youth had already saved \$18 million simply by cutting the number of youths in state custody. The real savings will come from cutting future juvenile and adult crime because the criminal justice cost for juvenile and adult crime in New York State is over \$4 billion every year, and that figure does not begin to account for the costs to victims.

## Making New York Safer

The 300-plus members of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids New York are convinced by the research and their own experience that change is necessary. They are discouraged that they are arresting a few kids over and over again. The most important message is probably the simplest: when deciding how to invest wisely in stopping juvenile crime use science, data collection, and accountability to guide policy. Investing in what really works to prevent crime will produce both huge savings and safer streets.



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# Getting Juvenile Justice Right in New York

## Proven Interventions Will Cut Crime and Save Money

### Introduction

**Fight Crime: Invest in Kids *New York*** is an anti-crime organization led by more than 300 law enforcement leaders—police chiefs, sheriffs and district attorneys—and survivors of crime. Most of the survivors are parents of murdered children.

Crime requires punishment. Punishment may be placing a young delinquent in custody or, depending on the crime, imposing a range of other tough sanctions. The bottom line is that New York residents must be safe walking the streets. Research shows, punishment alone will often not be enough; troubled teens will need help to stop their aggression, substance abuse, or other anti-social behaviors. It is usually not too late to change anti-social patterns of behavior. Sanctions that include strict and effective interventions can direct anti-social and dangerous juveniles onto a different path that will make New York safer.

### The Problem

New York law enforcement is working hard to make sure offending juveniles are arrested. Almost 50,000 juveniles are arrested every year.<sup>1</sup> The most dangerous are put in custody.

But New York is currently facing a problem with disastrous consequences for public safety. Police, prosecutors and sheriffs find themselves arresting, prosecuting, and housing some of the same kids again and again.

Approximately 2,500 juveniles are held in custody after their trial.\*<sup>2</sup> After they are released, 75 percent of these juvenile delinquents are re-arrested within three years.<sup>3</sup>

These rates indicate that New York is failing its young people and endangering its communities.<sup>4</sup> The cost of the system is staggering. The price for a juvenile placed in the custody of the New York Office of Children and Family Services is \$125,000 over 10 months<sup>5</sup>, and in New York City, it costs over \$200,000 to hold a juvenile in custody for a year.<sup>6</sup>

By contrast, the State University of New York reports that typical expenses for tuition and room and board are about \$17,000 a year. In addition, repeat crime results in massive economic and human costs for enforcement, loss of property, and loss of life. The researchers who provide cost of crime estimates to the Justice Department conclude that the total criminal justice costs of juvenile and adult crime for taxpayers in New York State is over \$4 billion. That figure does not include the even larger costs that accrue to crime victims.<sup>7</sup>

Maintaining a broken juvenile corrections system is clearly not cost-effective, and it does not effectively serve troubled kids or protect our communities. High rates of repeat offending among incarcerated youth are the warning signs that we are not effectively correcting criminal behavior; that troubled kids with mental health problems are not being properly identified and treated; and that kids who serve time are not being adequately monitored and provided with proven interventions that reduce their anti-social behavior when they return to their communities.

\* Technically, youth in New York State charged with a crime have a hearing on the facts, not a trial, but the more commonly understood term, trial, is used in this report.

## Who is doing most of the crimes?

Any analysis of juvenile crime in New York must keep in mind two key points:

- **Most juveniles arrested for the first time do not go on to be arrested for additional crimes.**

Nationally, 6 in 10 juveniles brought before a juvenile court for the first time will not return to court on another charge.<sup>8</sup> And most are not detained pretrial or held following trial because their crimes are minor: of the almost 50,000 juvenile arrests in New York State in 2001,<sup>9</sup> there were approximately 15,000 admissions into detention facilities pretrial;<sup>10</sup> and following trial, 2,500 juvenile delinquents were in state custody in 2005.<sup>11</sup> This report will show how those numbers for juveniles held in detention pretrial or in custody following trial could be reduced further while cutting additional crimes, but most juveniles' contact with the juvenile court system does not involve detention or custody and is not ongoing.

**Nationally, 6 in 10 juveniles brought before a juvenile court for the first time will not return to court on another charge. However, among the serious offenders committed to New York State custody as juveniles, 75 percent were arrested again for a felony and 42 percent were re-arrested for a violent felony.**

- **The small number of juveniles who are serious delinquents do not usually stop committing crimes when they turn 16.**

In New York State, young people aged 16 and over are charged as adults, as are some younger teens who commit very serious crimes.\* The repeat offending rates among the serious young delinquents processed through the juvenile justice system – the approximately 2,500 a year who are in juvenile justice custody—show that most of those young offenders are not learning to change their ways and far too many are on their way to becoming chronic criminals as adults. A 1999 study of repeat offending found disturbing results. Among the juvenile delinquents committed to state custody in New York State, “for males and females combined, 75 percent were arrested [again] for a felony or misdemeanor, and 42 percent were arrested for a violent felony.”<sup>12</sup> A number of changes

have been instituted in many localities throughout New York since 1999 to bring those numbers down, but much more can and should be done to reduce repeat offending by the small proportion of juvenile delinquents who are on their way to becoming chronic, serious, or violent offenders.

Academic research and the first-hand experience of law enforcement professionals confirm that serious violence is confined to a small minority of young people. For example, in the mid-nineties, criminologist David Kennedy carefully studied violence in Boston and found that, “Even in dangerous neighborhoods, only a tiny minority, fewer than one percent of the juveniles and young adults, were caught up in the violence.... They were involved in drug dealing street groups and enmeshed in shooting disputes with other chronic offenders. Most of the violence was not about the drug business, but about respect, boy/girl matters and standing vendettas, the origins of which were unclear even to the participants.”<sup>13</sup>

This report will begin by focusing on what works with juveniles who pose the greatest risk to their communities.

## What works with the highest-risk young offenders

### While they are in custody

There is no question that some young offenders 15 and under need to be placed in secure juvenile facilities because of the high risk they will repeat their dangerous crimes. In 2005, New York courts placed nearly 2,500 juvenile delinquents in custody. Many of those 2,500 could be more effectively served by community interventions instead of lock-up — as described below. But others will still need to be in custody, and merely warehousing high-risk young offenders during their time in custody is not adequate. They need to do the hard work of confronting and changing their anti-social beliefs and behaviors. If we use approaches proven by research to accomplish this, then high-risk young offenders are more likely to return to their communities less dangerous than when they went into custody.

Research shows that the best results in reducing crime are achieved by targeting the more serious young offenders. The reason why is straightforward: one cannot prevent most low-risk juveniles from committing more crimes because they were not going to do more crimes

\* In New York those younger youth are known, technically, as juvenile offenders, while all other juveniles processed through the juvenile court system are known as juvenile delinquents. But in this report we will use the term young offenders at times in the less technical way to refer to all young delinquents, not just those juveniles processed as adults.

anyway. But high-risk delinquents are very likely to commit more crimes and more serious crimes. Therefore, any progress achieved with higher-risk juveniles results in very meaningful reductions in future crime.

Two states have implemented reforms targeted towards those young offenders. Missouri has reformed how it handles juvenile delinquents in state custody and produced positive results. Wisconsin also has achieved impressive results with a specific intervention targeted to juveniles in custody who have serious mental health problems.

### Missouri


In 1994, Missouri began replacing its large juvenile corrections facility, known as a training school, with smaller facilities closer to the communities where the young offenders lived. Fulton Treatment Center, which opened in 1997, has become the prototype for Missouri's reforms. It uses an open-dorm model within a locked perimeter fence that guarantees security for the surrounding community. The facility has 33 beds, and the very carefully chosen staff members work constantly with the young offenders to ensure they address their problems with aggression, substance abuse, or other anti-social behaviors. Staff members are not the only ones teaching the teens new social skills and holding them accountable for their behavior. The other juveniles, in groups of 10 to 12, are enlisted through group meetings and individual interactions throughout the day to ensure that everyone learns to behave appropriately. These troubled teens are not just doing their time. By working together, they are also learning how to change their lives. A special team tracks their activities when they return to their communities to make sure they stay out of further trouble.<sup>14</sup>

States collect data differently on re-arrests, reconvictions, and additional incarcerations, and they collect the data over different periods of time, making it hard to compare results across states. Missouri does have reconviction data that can be compared to similar New York reconviction data. The three-year reconviction rate for juveniles leaving Missouri's juvenile custody system is 37 percent.<sup>15</sup> That rate is 40 percent lower than the closest comparable New York three-year reconviction (not arrest) rate of 62 percent for juvenile delinquents leaving state custody.<sup>16</sup> (New York's re-arrest rate is 72 percent.)

Unlike many states, New York does not have very large facilities for its juvenile delinquents so it will not have to build many smaller facilities in order to adopt Missouri-style reforms. But if Missouri-style reforms are adopted, New York should phase in reforms in order to make sure

### Missouri Reforms Cut Crime

The percent of juveniles held in state custody who are released and return to a state juvenile facility within three years




the reforms are being properly implemented. Renovated facilities that are more like dormitories may be needed and staff members need to be fully trained to follow the approach Missouri uses for working with young offenders.

### Wisconsin

Some of the most troubled teen boys in Wisconsin state custody who had failed their other placement were transferred to the Mendota Center to receive special help in changing their behavior. The center is located within a high-security state mental health institute. In their prior placement, the behavior of most of the troubled teens had been in a spiral downward during which sanctions were imposed repeatedly for negative behaviors. Each time sanctions were imposed, the young offenders became antagonistic and responded with more negative behaviors. By using skilled mental health staff members, instead of corrections officers, the center was able to stop this downward spiral and connect with these very troubled teens. Then the staff began teaching them how to control their aggressive, anti-social behaviors. Similar to what was discovered in Missouri, Dr. Gregory Van Rybroek, the director, reported that finding the right staff who can bond with the young offenders was essential, as was being able to combine enhanced security with continued training of youth in changing their behaviors.<sup>17</sup>

### Wisconsin Intervention Reduces Repeat Crimes

Very troubled juvenile offenders who were not treated at a secure mental health facility in Wisconsin averaged more than twice as many total offenses after release, and more than three times as many violent offenses, as those who received treatment.



Caldwell, Vitacco, & Van Rybroek 2006

One evaluation of the intervention matched 101 teens going through the Mendota center with 101 similarly troubled teens in the regular juvenile corrections system. Within an average follow-up period of 53 months after their release, teens who had not been in the center were charged with twice as many offenses per person and had more than three times the number of violent offenses per person as teens who were treated at the center.<sup>18</sup>

Another analysis of the Mendota Center intervention compared the serious young offenders at Mendota to another similar group of 147 other seriously troubled offenders in state custody and followed them upon release over a period of 54 months. None of the 101 offenders from the center committed a homicide during that follow-up period, but 10 of the 147 offenders in the control group were charged with murder. A total of sixteen people were killed by the 147 young offenders not going through Mendota.<sup>19</sup>

More research is needed to confirm that this approach can be replicated elsewhere with similar results. These results, however, appear to provide further strong evidence that the negative behaviors of even very troubled juveniles can be changed, improving the safety of New York communities.

### When they return home

Even if they serve substantial time, dangerous juveniles at high risk of committing more violence usually end up back in their communities for their crimes. This can be a danger to the safety of their neighbors if they receive little or no supervision and assistance to avoid more crime. A combination of intensive police supervision, expedited sanctions for repeated violence, community pressure, and expedited access to jobs, drug treatment or other services — a carrot-and-stick approach — has shown in a number of cities that it can cut homicides among violent juveniles in high-crime neighborhoods.


Chicago copied and further refined the carrot-and-stick approach for turning violent young men's lives around that was first developed in Boston for use with juvenile and adult gang members. In Chicago's use of this approach, violent offenders returning from prison were called into a meeting where a team of police officers and prosecutors explained the "stick." The young men on parole were being carefully watched and were facing expedited and severe sanctions if they committed another violent offense, especially one involving a gun. Then they heard about the "carrot" from former gang members who had successfully turned their lives around and social service providers who offered expedited access to services. As Andrew Papachristos of the University of Chicago explained, if the parolees needed drug treatment or a job (if necessary, a government-subsidized job), they were told, "You can sign up now and start Monday."<sup>20</sup>

In the most rigorous research to date on this carrot-and-stick method, this approach was tried in a group of west side Chicago neighborhoods with a population of nearly 8,000 residents. The neighborhoods had a long history of high levels of homicide. The research was done under the auspices of the federally-funded Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN). Meanwhile, another set of neighborhoods in the south side of Chicago with a similar, though less serious, history of homicides served as the control group because there was not enough funding initially to do this carrot- and-stick approach citywide. In the carrot-and-stick area there was a 37 percent drop in quarterly homicide rates following the offender notification meetings of PSN while the decline in homicides in the other neighborhood during the same period was 18 percent.<sup>21</sup>

A similar carrot-and-stick approach was originally tried with gang members in Boston. David Kennedy, then at the Kennedy School at Harvard and now at John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York City, explained that their coalition of law enforcement leaders, local religious leaders, street mentors, and service providers "used

## The Carrot-and-Stick Approach Cuts Homicides

Project Safe Neighborhood included increased federal prosecution for gun crimes and used offender notification meetings and increased services—a carrot-and-stick approach—that sharply brought down homicides in the west side Chicago neighborhood where it was tested. Homicides also dropped, but not as fast in a similar south side control neighborhood and city-wide.



enforcement as sparingly as possible, and combined it with services and the moral voice of the community.” Kennedy found that, “After adjusting for existing trends, youth homicide (victims ages 24 and under) went down by two-thirds.” When replicated in Indianapolis, homicides went down quickly by 34 percent.<sup>22</sup> In Philadelphia, a similar targeting of young offenders on probation or parole—those who were most likely to “kill or be killed”—was implemented in three police districts. An evaluation showed that homicides decreased by between 32 and 62 percent in those districts. Since that data were collected, homicides have gone up overall in Philadelphia, and two of the districts where the programs are operating have also seen recent increases, but the increases have been slower than citywide. In the other district where the program operates, homicides have continued to go down.<sup>23</sup>

The Chicago effort was specifically targeted at violent offenders returning to their neighborhoods from adult prison, whether they entered custody as teenagers or adults. However the experience of Boston, Philadelphia and other cities show that the most dangerous juvenile delinquents, not just young adults, should also be targeted for carrot-and-stick style sanctions and interventions.

This approach has also been successful in medium-sized cities, such as Baton Rouge, La. and Stockton, Calif.<sup>24</sup>

Sustaining a team focus is essential. Indianapolis has a paid staff member to ensure their team stays together and their meetings with high-risk juveniles and adults continue.<sup>25</sup> Unfortunately, in Boston, as the coalition of law enforcement, service providers, and community leaders broke up over time, homicides started going back up.<sup>26</sup>

Currently, there are several carrot-and-stick approaches in operation across New York State. For example, Nassau County has been targeting gang members since January 2006 with both community intervention and prevention strategies that capitalize on the “moral voice” of the community. In 2005, before the program began, Nassau County had 7 gang related homicides. After the program was instituted, Nassau County reported 4 gang related homicides in 2006.<sup>27</sup>

## What works with medium-risk offenders

### Who need out-of-home placements

The prior section discussed what to do with the highest-risk, most violence-prone juveniles. However, many juvenile delinquents aged 15 and under in New York have been placed in state custody or are being held following trial in local facilities even though they are not at high-risk of committing violent crimes. In New York City, four out of ten beds for juvenile delinquents (188 of 461 beds) are for juveniles held in what are called group-care facilities instead of secure facilities. Upstate, 6 out of 10 beds for juveniles are in group-care facilities (337 of 564 beds).<sup>28</sup> This section will explore what works with many of those juveniles held in medium- or low-level-security facilities to reduce their future involvement in crime.

The Missouri approach to juvenile facilities was discussed above as a solution for the most serious young offenders. Missouri also follows the same model at its less-secure facilities. These facilities, located throughout the state, are aimed at reducing repeat crimes among juvenile delinquents who do not need high-security confinement, but who do need intensive help to change their criminal behaviors. The Missouri model should be considered as one option for how to more effectively deal with less-dangerous juvenile delinquents who cannot remain in their homes.

Another option for many of these young offenders is individual placement in a Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) home instead of with other delinquent juveniles in a county or state facility. For teens who are often used to running the streets, a month in custody may become a chance to socialize with other young offenders and learn new criminal behaviors. In contrast, the MTFC approach creates a highly controlled environment and is a very tough intervention with constant monitoring and appropriate sanctions.


The foster parents are carefully chosen and trained, and usually only work with one child at a time. When young offenders come into their homes, the youngsters are initially not allowed to leave their sight during waking hours. They must earn the right to be alone those first few days. Then they must attend school regularly, carrying a card each day for their teachers to sign. Teachers from every period must sign the card, noting whether the students showed up and behaved appropriately. Eventually, the youngsters can earn opportunities to interact with positive peers outside of school, but negative behaviors quickly result in the loss of those privileges.

Meanwhile, a professional works with each teen to train them in the social skills they need to avoid fights or situations that can lead to further crime. While the child is living in this very controlled environment for six months to a year, his or her parents are being trained to take over and establish and enforce the same rules and expectations when their child returns home.<sup>29</sup>

Treatment foster care is more effective at reducing future arrests than placement in a group home. Research shows the MTFC approach successfully cuts the average number of arrests for seriously delinquent juveniles in half (2.6 arrests per teen vs. 5.4 arrests), and six times as many of the boys in MTFC as boys in a group home successfully avoided any new arrest (41 percent vs. 7 percent).<sup>30</sup>

MTFC can also be an option for young offenders re-entering their communities after state or city custody if they do not have stable homes to return to. At a treatment foster care home, young offenders leaving custody can learn the skills they will need to stay out of trouble as they return to school or seek employment. And their parents will receive the training they need to continue this process once their children transition fully back home.

MTFC is becoming more widely used in a number of states, including New York. Yet there are currently only 30 MTFC beds in the Bronx and 20 MTFC beds upstate.<sup>31</sup> Hundreds more beds are needed because there are over 500 group-care (non-MTFC) beds for juveniles in custody statewide and many of the kids filling those beds would commit fewer crimes if they were placed with MTFC instead.<sup>32</sup>



For MTFC to work in counties with smaller populations of delinquents, the counties may have to develop partnerships with neighboring counties to cost-effectively arrange for the training, supervision, and support that is needed for MTFC foster families.

### Who may not need custody

#### **Six counties in New York are exploring placing many juvenile delinquents in interventions instead of custody — it worked in Ohio.**

There are times when the nature of the crime or crimes committed simply demands that a juvenile be sentenced to state or city custody following trial. In other situations though, court-ordered alternative sanctions that do not include custody may actually work better to reduce future crime. If, in addition to the usual probation measures such as community service and curfews, a judge also orders participation in a carefully structured intervention, juveniles can be taught to avoid crime by adopting new social skills, attitudes and beliefs.

Six counties in New York State — Albany, Nassau, Orange, Rensselaer, Schenectady, and Suffolk — are currently exploring an initiative that would take more of their juveniles who are at low- or moderate-risk of endangering their community and shift them into probation with strict sanctions and effective community interventions, such as family therapy, instead of placing them in custody. By keeping these youth in their homes or in special foster homes, whenever that can be done safely, the interventions that are part of this initiative help the young offenders and their families to gain control of their troubled behaviors so they can avoid further involvement in crime. With initial guidance from Dennis Maloney, who was an innovative juvenile justice reformer from Oregon who had advised other states and localities on similar efforts, these New York counties are working collaboratively on this initiative. It is known as Reform New York, and has been moving forward under the auspices of the New York State Council of Children and Families and the New York State Community Justice Forum.

New York City has also been moving forward with a similar effort, called Redirect New York, designed to keep troubled kids out of custody and to use effective interventions whenever possible (see chart, page 22 on reforms underway in New York City).

There is strong evidence that this approach of redirecting juvenile delinquents to effective interventions will save money and cut crime. The analysis of a similar effort in Ohio, called RECLAIM Ohio, found that diverting low, moderate, and in some cases even high-risk juveniles to

community sanctions with effective interventions in place of custody successfully cut future crime. The data collected by Christopher Lowenkamp and Edward Latessa, professors at the University of Cincinnati, showed that, if low-to moderate-risk delinquents were placed in local custody and not in a community RECLAIM intervention, they returned to custody upon release at five to seven times the rate of juveniles in the RECLAIM interventions. RECLAIM also worked better for many lower-risk youth in state custody, not just those in local custody.<sup>33</sup>


It is important to note that this approach should not be directed to the “very high-risk” delinquents. The RECLAIM researchers found that the very highest risk juveniles — teens with a combination of current felonies, prior felonies and at least three referrals to the courts starting before age 14 — should not be diverted to community interventions because they committed more crimes over time than if they were sent to RECLAIM instead of to state custody.<sup>34</sup> But for low- medium- and even some high-risk delinquents, RECLAIM reduces crime better than placing kids in custody. Any New York counties considering adopting this approach should therefore continue to send the “very high-risk” delinquents to state or local custody.

### Risk assessments are essential

The RECLAIM results clearly showed the importance of taking into account a juvenile’s risk of committing more crimes. Decisions on where delinquents will serve their sentence and what services they need to avoid future crime should be carefully informed by scientifically valid risk assessments. To its credit, New York’s Division of Probation and Correctional Alternatives (DPCA), which helps counties provide probation services throughout the state, spearheaded development of a risk-assessment tool known as the Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument (YASI). YASI is based on a well-respected risk assessment instrument developed in Washington State.<sup>35</sup> It looks not only at the number and nature of crimes committed, as was done for assessing RECLAIM, but also at the juvenile’s personal history and the strengths and weaknesses of the support systems the young offender can rely on to stay free of crime. DPCA has been promoting the use of YASI as part of its ongoing efforts to increase the use of evidenced-based practices to cut crime. The YASI instrument is currently used in 54 of 57 New York State jurisdictions and will be used in all counties except New York City by the end of 2007.<sup>36</sup> New York City, with the help of the Vera Institute of Justice, is currently developing its own Risk Assessment

## Ohio's RECLAIM Community-Based Interventions Cut Re-Offending Among Most Juvenile Offenders

Percent of juvenile offenders returning to custody



Note: while the data in this graph only refers to diversions from local custody, similar results were achieved by diverting youth from state custody.

Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2005

Instrument (RAI).<sup>37</sup> DPCA and others are helping to ensure that judges and other court personnel are taking full advantage of the YASI findings when making their sentencing or probation plans for individuals. YASI or the RAI will never reach their full potential to prevent crime unless there are also a range of effective interventions in place where young offenders can be directed for treatment.

### The wisdom of using scientifically-tested interventions

The best way to ensure that streets will be safer is to rely on sanctions and interventions proven by the best methods of scientific testing. It is common practice now in the medical sciences to randomly assign half the people in a test to receive a medicine while the other half receive placebos. In juvenile justice research this is done by randomly assigning half the juveniles to receive a new intervention and the other half to receive the usual services they would otherwise receive. Then the researchers monitor crime data over time to see which group commits more crime. There is now solid evidence emerging from a growing number of such randomized controlled trials that shows what works. Two general approaches, in particular, have been shown to reliably cut crime: Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy (CBT) and the related Family Therapy. In short, the first one gives troubled teens

the tools they will need to behave responsibly, and the second approach gives parents the tools they will need to regain control of their kids, keep them off the streets, and steer them away from crime.

### Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy teaches teens to control their aggression or stop using drugs

Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy for teen offenders is an approach, not a specific intervention. It was developed from original research on what works to help many people, not just youths involved with crime or drugs, to change their undesirable behaviors or to cope with depression. When applied to delinquent juveniles, the researchers found that many young offenders have developed thinking, beliefs, and behaviors that repeatedly land them in trouble. They often misinterpret others' benign actions as threats. Many troubled juveniles approach challenging situations as victims, feeling they are hated and unfairly blamed.<sup>38</sup> CBT interventions use tested methods to teach teens to "stop and think before acting, to consider the consequences of their behavior, to conceptualize alternative ways of responding to interpersonal problems and to consider the impact of their behavior on other people, particularly the victims."<sup>39</sup> By learning what triggers their own negative behaviors and by identifying and practicing more socially acceptable

and effective ways to respond, CBT consistently reduced repeat crimes among both juveniles and adults.

A recent review by Mark Lipsey and Nana Landenberger from Vanderbilt of 58 CBT randomized controlled trials and other careful trials found that, on average, the re-arrest rate among the adults or juveniles in CBT was 25 percent less than for those not in a CBT intervention. And the CBT interventions using the most effective configurations—programs that treated delinquents at higher risk of committing more crimes, were implemented well, and included anger control and interpersonal problem solving—reduced re-arrest rates by 50 percent.<sup>40</sup>

CBT can be successfully used with juveniles as an alternative to custody following trial, while they are in custody, or with juveniles returning home from custody. Many different providers have delivered CBT services, and as long as what they provide faithfully applies the CBT model, the research by Lipsey and Landenberger showed it worked.<sup>41</sup> One of the most widely used CBT approaches, Aggression Replacement Training, was tested among youths in New York State (see box). The Lipsey and Landenberger review found that CBT is one of the most rigorously tested and reliably successful interventions to be found anywhere in the social sciences.<sup>42</sup>

### Training families to control their troubled children

Another series of proven interventions (which typically incorporate cognitive behavior therapy as part of their set of tools) is family therapy. Family therapy is a very broadly used term that includes marriage counseling and various other interventions. But a more specific range of family therapy interventions that target young offenders

with aggression and/or substance abuse problems have proven results.

Most troubled young people, even if they go into custody, will return to their families. Families play an influential role in their children’s aggression or substance abuse. That influence can be either positive or negative. Many parents, who may have made many unwise decisions themselves, do not want their children to make the same mistakes. They may be poorly trained, however, in how to keep their children off the streets, out of fights, and away from drugs, especially if they live in dangerous neighborhoods.

Effective family therapy typically begins by convincing families that change is possible. It usually involves teaching family members how to stop arguing with each other. Then, parents are taught how to keep better track of their child’s behavior, to set clear limits, and to reinforce positive behaviors. For example, a child who has repeatedly behaved well will be rewarded with the opportunity to spend more unsupervised time with positive friends.

Once parents have been given the right tools, the professionals help them practice until they are getting results on their own and their children are no longer out of control and getting into trouble. Others are brought into the process, such as extended family members, teachers, positive peers, and service providers. They can increase the quantity and quality of positive influences in troubled teens’ lives, and help strengthen the parents’ ability to manage their children’s behaviors. Together this extended network helps embed the juveniles in a positive environment that keeps them away from drugs and crime.

A number of family therapy interventions have been repeatedly evaluated using randomized controlled trials. The body of research shows that — when properly imple-

Cognitive Behavioral Therapies (CBT)	Results
<p><b>Aggression Replacement Training (ART)</b> At under \$1,000 per juvenile, this CBT intervention that targets aggression is a relatively low-cost intervention for teens on probation or in custody.<sup>114</sup></p>	<p>Offenders leaving a New York State Division of Youth (now known as OCFS) facility were almost three times more likely to have been arrested within 6 months of release if they did not receive ART services while in custody than if they did (43 percent vs. 15 percent).<sup>115</sup></p>
<p><b>Motivational Enhancement Therapy &amp; Cognitive Behavior Therapy (MET/CBT)</b> This intervention is for outpatient use with substance-abusing teens.<sup>116</sup></p>	<p>The average number of days in a year that persons who successfully complete an outpatient substance abuse treatment intervention are drug free increases by 25% to 35% if they receive MET/CBT (251, 256, and 269 days drug free in three trials of MET/CBT vs. 200 drug free days in an average outpatient treatment intervention).<sup>117</sup></p>

mented — quality family therapy interventions can reduce substance abuse and repeat crimes.

### High-quality interventions and an effective staff produce the best results

Mark Lipsey and his team looked at a large number of studies of interventions to prevent juvenile delinquency that typically compared the intervention being studied to the usual services that would otherwise be available in each locality (such as simple probation, placement in a group home, or probation with individual counseling). Lipsey not only looked at whether the interventions worked better than the usual services the juvenile would

be assigned to, he also looked for clues from the various studies as to why they worked. Specifically, he looked at whether the design of the interventions was weak (interventions cobbled together) or whether they were strong designs (interventions based on past scientific research and development which were then carefully tested). Lipsey also looked at whether or not a well-trained, experienced staff was implementing the program being tested.

Lipsey and his team found that a weak intervention with ineffective staff, not surprisingly, does not reduce repeat crimes compared to usual services. Interestingly, if the intervention was either strongly designed but poorly staffed, or weakly designed but well staffed, it produced

Family Therapies	Results
<p><b>Functional Family Therapy (FFT)</b>            FFT is available in juvenile justice or mental health programs in 13 counties and New York City. It is for moderate to high-risk teens with delinquency, aggression and/or substance abuse problems.<sup>118</sup> FFT can be used for youths on probation, in lieu of custody, or for youths returning to their families from custody.<sup>119</sup></p>	<p>It cut re-arrests in half in one study (26 percent vs. 50 percent) and out-of-home placements by three quarters in another study (18 percent vs. 72 percent).<sup>120</sup></p>
<p><b>Multisystemic Therapy (MST)</b>            Similar to FFT, MST is now, or soon will be, operating in 17 counties and New York City.<sup>121</sup> It serves moderate to high-risk teens, though MST often serves teens more involved in drug abuse and/or crime than those served by FFT.<sup>122</sup></p>	<p>One MST study followed juvenile offenders until they were, on average, 29 years old. Individuals who had not received MST were 62 percent more likely to have been arrested for any offense (81 percent vs. 50 percent), and more than twice as likely to be arrested for a violent offense (30 percent vs. 14 percent).<sup>123</sup></p>
<p><b>Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)</b>            This family therapy intervention can be used for offenders in place of being placed in low-security custody in a group setting, or as a step-down intervention for offenders leaving custody who do not have stable families to return to.<sup>124</sup> There are currently 30 MTFC beds in the Bronx and 20 MTFC beds upstate.<sup>125</sup></p>	<p>MTFC cut the average number of repeat arrests per teen in half compared to boys in a group home (2.6 arrests vs. 5.4). Six times as many of the boys in MTFC as boys in a group homes had successfully avoided any new arrest (41 percent vs. 7 percent).<sup>126</sup></p>
<p><b>Brief Strategic Family Therapy (BSFT)</b>            This is a family therapy aimed at reducing a youth's drug use and conduct disorder.<sup>127</sup></p>	<p>Forty three percent of youth in BSFT with conduct disorder (defiant and/or delinquent behavior) showed clinically significant reductions, while youth in group counseling with conduct disorder saw no reductions. Additionally, youth using drugs in BSFT were 3.5 times more likely to show clinically significant reductions in drug use than youth using drugs in group counseling.<sup>128</sup></p>

For more information on each of these evidence-based interventions, see Appendix A.

the same results: a 24 percent reduction in repeat crimes compared to the usual services being offered young offenders. But, if the intervention was both strongly designed and well staffed, the results were almost twice as strong: a 46 percent reduction in repeat crimes.<sup>43</sup>

This table below shows that localities in New York that have not started using proven interventions for their delinquent juveniles can cut repeat crimes almost in half among eligible young offenders. Even in counties and cities already using proven interventions they can cut repeat crimes an additional 22 percentage points among eligible young offenders by ensuring the intervention is run by well-trained, experienced staff.

### Advice for choosing programs

Based in part on the above research, experts in the field suggest that, when choosing which scientifically-tested intervention to adopt, policymakers and administrators need to carefully consider whether they have the ongoing funding to support a particular intervention, and also whether they have the ability to recruit to their area the level of trained personnel necessary for that particular intervention. Some interventions are more expensive or require more highly-trained personnel than others. Picking an intervention with proven results that cannot be implemented well locally will get a county only half way down the road to lowered crime rates. Picking the right intervention and providing it with well-qualified and well-trained staff, however, can easily pay for itself many times over by reducing future crime.

## Substance abusing teens

Drug and alcohol abuse are a huge problem among juvenile delinquents. While only six percent of young people in detention awaiting trial or delinquents in custody following their trial in New York were actually being held primarily because of drug charges,<sup>44</sup> the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) of the National Institutes of Health reports that, nationally, “in 2002, ... 60 percent of detained boys and nearly half of the girls tested positive for drug use.”<sup>45</sup>

Only about one in twenty New York young people 12 to 17 years old who are abusing or dependent on drugs (beyond just those experimenting with drugs) are receiving treatment.<sup>46</sup> The juvenile justice system is the most common pathway for young people to receive substance abuse treatment in America. Nationally over 50 percent of the referrals for juvenile substance abuse treatment in 2003 came from the juvenile justice system.<sup>47</sup> One problem with getting teens into treatment, either those who have been ordered by the court to attend or those who have not, is getting them to take it seriously. The reality is that teens have even more trouble than adults in admitting they have problems with alcohol or drugs.<sup>48</sup> There is also a severe shortage of treatment options, especially for low-income juveniles.

Young delinquents entering the juvenile justice system should be routinely and appropriately screened for drug or alcohol problems. Michael Dennis, a national expert on adolescent drug abuse, explains that catching substance abuse early is important because “90 percent of all individuals who become dependent started using before the age of 18, and half started using before the age of 15.”<sup>49</sup> Appropriate questioning will differentiate juveniles who are just experimenting from juveniles who are

<b>What works (and doesn't work) to reduce repeat crimes by juveniles<sup>129</sup></b>	<b>A weakly-designed intervention</b>	<b>A strongly-designed intervention</b>
<b>A poorly trained staff</b>	<b>No reduction in repeat crimes compared to usual services</b>	<b>24% reduction in repeat crimes</b>
<b>A well-trained and effective staff</b>	<b>24% reduction in repeat crimes</b>	<b>46% reduction in repeat crimes</b>

regularly abusing or actually dependent on drugs or alcohol. The juveniles who are abusing or dependent should receive effective treatment.<sup>50</sup>

Dennis also cautions that substance abuse needs to be treated as a chronic health problem. “Seventy percent of the kids who are treated will relapse. But if you go through and treat them three or four times, 70 percent will recover,” Dennis writes.<sup>51</sup> “To reduce the long-term costs of chronic [dependence on drugs or alcohol] to individuals, their families and society, it is important to diagnose and intervene as early as possible, ideally with adolescents and young adults.”<sup>52</sup>

**Drug treatment for youth in custody:** An approach to drug treatment, known as therapeutic communities, has shown consistent success with adults in custody and also has been shown to work with juveniles in custody. In this approach teen delinquents play a very active role in confronting their peers’ behaviors.<sup>53</sup> The approach also incorporates some aspects of cognitive behavior therapy. In one test, within 21 months after release, the drug-abusing teens not receiving the therapeutic community treatment were more than twice as likely to be re-incarcerated (37 percent incarcerated vs. 17 percent) as those receiving therapeutic community treatment.<sup>54</sup>

**Outpatient drug treatment for delinquent juveniles:** NIDA has recommended that many substance-abusing young people should be directed to out-patient family therapies including FFT, MST, and BSFT.<sup>55</sup>

Michael Dennis and his colleagues have conducted other randomized controlled trials of the most promising interventions and found that a cognitive behavioral intervention, MET/CBT, that included a motivational component, could also be effective for redirecting drug use (see graph, page 22).<sup>56</sup>

**Assertive follow-up works after treatment:** For young delinquents leaving treatment, supportive services and—if needed— additional treatment, greatly increases the likelihood of eventual success. The Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach (ACRA) provides assertive follow-up after treatment instead of the typical less-intensive after-care, such as simply providing directions to the local 12-step meetings for teens. It has proven results. Teens receiving ACRA were 68 percent more likely to abstain from further marijuana use (52 percent vs. 31 percent).<sup>57</sup> (See Appendix A for more information on ACRA).

## Many other youth do not need juvenile justice programs

Often, parents taking responsibility for their troubled youth will be enough to prevent more crime if the parents can also draw on community resources. Juvenile justice programs are not necessary for many first-time or low-level offenders.

Research shows that young people who have committed a large number of crimes before being caught the first time may not find one arrest enough to convince them to stop, but for teenagers who are just starting to commit crimes, such as shoplifting, one arrest can be enough to turn them away from further criminal behavior.<sup>58</sup> Nationally, six in 10 juveniles who are referred to juvenile court do not return.<sup>59</sup> Juveniles need to learn they must pay a price for their crimes, but that price may not need to include custody or extensive interventions paid for by the juvenile justice system for many first-time delinquents. With help from local programs in their community, parents can usually step in to make sure a first-time offender does not return to court on additional charges.

There is a physiological reason why many teenagers break the law. Most adolescents are more impulsive, inattentive, and insensitive to the consequences of their actions than adults. Scans of adolescents’ brains show their prefrontal cortex, which is the seat of rational thought and the ability to control impulses, is not fully developed until early adulthood.<sup>60</sup> That tendency to impulsive behavior frequently includes impulsive criminal behavior. National surveys of teens conducted from 1997 to 2001 found that 38 percent of 17 year-old boys and 30 percent of girls that age admitted having committed a petty theft.<sup>61</sup> Another national survey conducted in 2003 found that over half of all high school seniors admitted having tried an illicit drug.<sup>62</sup>

Relatively minor sanctions, such as a fine or community service, may serve justice and be adequate to stop many young offenders from committing more crimes — especially if parents do their part.

Restorative justice interventions are another option that recognizes how crime impacts victims and communities. These interventions allow victims to speak about the impact of the offense, and work with the offender on the best way to repair the harm. Typically this is done through agreed upon restitution or community service. Restorative justice often includes victim-offender dialogue, victim impact panels, and community-based

accountability boards. Research shows these programs are very popular with crime victims.<sup>63</sup> At the state and local level, The New York State Community Justice Forum is the primary resource for training and technical assistance in the area of community and restorative justice.<sup>64</sup>

If delinquent young people have other risk factors for crime or are very young when arrested the first time, it may be especially wise for parents to carefully monitor and control which peers they associate with and to enroll them in proven community programs such as Boys and Girls Clubs, Big Brothers/Big Sisters, or other interventions for at-risk youth that are not necessarily part of the juvenile justice system.<sup>65</sup> But, funding for the more expensive interventions described above that are provided through the juvenile justice system should be reserved for young offenders whose risk assessments show they are more likely to continue committing more crimes.

## Reducing pretrial detention saves money

### Changing how truants, runaways, and youth who are out of control of their parents are treated

New York City and other localities throughout the state have already begun to reform how they deal with truant youth, youth staying away from home or youth otherwise out of the control of their parents. Juveniles with these behaviors are known as Persons In Need of Supervision, or PINS cases. PINS offenses would not be a crime if committed by an adult.

Prior to 2002, throughout New York State, Persons In Need of Supervision, or PINS cases were clogging up the court, detention, and out-of-home placement systems. This was true even before PINS legislation required counties to also treat 16 and 17 year olds PINS cases as eligible for supervision through the juvenile court system. In 2003, 22 percent of all youth in out-of-home placement or in custody for delinquency statewide were PINS youth. This was far higher than what was reported for almost all other states in the country. In fact, 41 out of 50 states reported that less than 10 percent of their youths being held in custody were being held on PINS-type offenses.<sup>66</sup>

New York City found that, with PINS reforms, PINS youth and their parents could receive assessments and services earlier and far more youths could be diverted from the courts. Since 2002, probation intakes of PINS cases dropped by more than 80 percent in New York City.

The number of cases going to court was cut by more than half, and out-of-home placements for PINS are down by one quarter. That will potentially free up personnel, and funding which should be redirected to youths committing more serious non-PINS offenses. Similar reforms are beginning to show results throughout the state. For example, Orange County cut PINS cases under probation supervision by 43 percent and youth placed outside their homes by 31 percent, while Onondaga County cut PINS placements by 95 percent, from 67 cases in 1995 to 5 in 2003.<sup>67</sup>

### Reducing pretrial detention of first time and low-level young offenders

The changes underway in handling PINS cases are already reducing the number of children held in detention, but other reforms are also underway in how young offenders are being handled pretrial. Reducing the number of juvenile delinquents who are detained pretrial may not immediately reduce repeat crimes. In fact, if some high-risk young people involved in dangerous criminal behavior are not placed in detention pending trial, the number of violent offenses committed between when they are arrested and when they come back to court for trial on the crime may actually go up. However, New York City and a number of counties in New York, as well as Cook County in Illinois, and other locations around the country have found that, under the right circumstances, pre-trial detention reforms can be used to safely redirect and supervise the large number of young delinquents who are not a serious threat to their communities. Pretrial detention reforms will free up juvenile justice resources that should be redirected by policymakers into proven interventions for the more serious delinquents. If funding can be redirected to a combination of typical sanctions (custody or community service, etc.), and proven interventions to reduce the continuing criminal behaviors of the more serious delinquents, crime in New York communities can be reduced not just immediately, but for years to come.

Across the United States local jurisdictions are showing they can successfully reduce the number of young people held in pretrial detention by 30 to 60 percent while maintaining public safety.

## What works to keep offenders at low-risk of committing violent crimes out of pre-trial detention

**Screening.** Properly screening young people arrested, rather than routinely detaining them, is the most crucial step in reducing unnecessary pretrial detention. In Seattle, efforts are succeeding in diverting young people who are arrested before they are ever placed in detention.<sup>68</sup> Even if youth are initially detained to wait for trial because their parents could not be found or for other reasons, an effective screening tool—such as New York State’s Youth Assessment and Screening Instrument (YASI)—can be used to divert the lower-risk youths out of detention and into other forms of supervision (discussed below) until their trial.<sup>69</sup> In New York State, a PINS petition is designed as a tool to help kids younger than 18 years old until they are able to make positive decisions on their own behalf. In most cases, it is more appropriate to divert these cases of truancy, running-away or other family problems to the child welfare system and community-based organizations instead of the juvenile justice system.

**Reducing bureaucratic delays.** Even when young people must be held pretrial, often their stay in detention can be shortened. Simple reforms such as utilizing “case expeditors,”<sup>70</sup> common discovery request forms,<sup>71</sup> and quick, initial screens for mental health problems can streamline the process.<sup>72</sup> When initial screens show that young offenders need a full mental health work-up, either placing the mental health clinic in the city detention facility<sup>73</sup>—if the facility is in a city or county that serves enough juveniles—or simply ensuring that the mental health evaluations are expedited can reduce individuals’ time in detention and thus help reduce the total number of young people held in detention facilities.

**Timely warnings and follow-up.** Juvenile delinquents often end up in detention because they miss court dates. Often, the delinquents purposely ignore the court date and a new warrant for their arrest and detention should be issued. But other times it is not that purposeful. One solution that works is to do what doctor’s and dentist’s offices frequently do: have court or detention staff call the juvenile’s house with a reminder shortly before the court date.<sup>74</sup> If a court date is missed, having court personnel quickly check on why that happened may, at least in some cases, cut short the automatic process of issuing a court order and sending police out to arrest and detain the delinquent juvenile.<sup>75</sup>

**Alternatives to detention.** In some localities, the only options available to authorities are to detain those

accused of a crime or to send them home. Unfortunately, this can mean many juveniles at relatively low-risk of committing violent crimes end up detained before trial, wasting scarce juvenile system resources. A wider range of options would reduce the need for holding juveniles pretrial. The alternatives being used around the country include:

•**Short-term alternatives to detention placement** allow police to get back out on the streets by dropping off juvenile delinquents with personnel who can take the time to track down the juvenile’s parents or guardians instead of placing the youths directly into detention.<sup>76</sup>

•**Parental supervision** combined with effective outside supervision using probation staff members or a community representative to ensure the young people are attending school and observing curfews.

•**Electronic monitoring** for some teens to track whether they are staying where they are ordered to be.

•**Evening Reporting Centers** are a successful innovation used by Cook County. These reporting centers are a place where teens are required to be when they are not at home or in school. The centers are especially useful in the after-school hours—the prime time for juvenile crime on school days. The centers can serve as an important location for delivering much needed support for troubled teens.

## Success stories from other states

**Cook County, Ill.** cut its average daily population in locked detention by more than a third from 1995 to 2005 in part because of detention reforms.<sup>77</sup> The reformers are especially proud of the fact that 97 percent of young people directed to evening reporting centers instead of detention before their hearings are arrest free and showing up for their appointed court date.<sup>78</sup> In part because of detention reforms, Cook County’s detention admissions decreased by 30 percent between 1989 and 2000, while

**Cook County’s detention admissions decreased by 30 percent between 1989 and 2000, while admissions went up 81 percent in the rest of Illinois.**

admissions went up 81 percent in the rest of Illinois.<sup>79</sup> By using MST and other reforms, Cook County has also dropped the number of youth it sends to state facilities following adjudication by 44 percent — from 902 in 1997 to 505 in 2004.<sup>80</sup>

**Santa Cruz County, Calif.** is experiencing a 95 percent success rate with home supervision and a 98 percent success rate with electronic monitoring in terms of offenders who show up for their hearings without having been arrested for any new crimes. Time spent in detention is also down: the average length of stay in Santa Cruz County's juvenile hall is now 10 days compared to a state average of 27 days.<sup>81</sup> Juvenile felony arrests are down 47 percent from 1997 to 2004, and youths in juvenile hall have dropped 65 percent from an average of 47 per day in 1997 to 16 in 2005.<sup>82</sup> By implementing community-based alternatives to incarceration following any hearing, Santa Cruz has also reduced the youth going to state facilities by 64 percent — from 104 in 1996 to 38 in 2004.<sup>83</sup>

**Bernalillo County, N.M.** implemented pretrial detention reforms coupled with effective intervention, such as family therapy, following trial. Testifying before Congress, Dr. Ken Martinez, the State Children's Behavioral Health Director, reported that the Bernalillo County Juvenile Detention Center now has:

- An average daily census of 65 youth held in detention, down from 140.
- An average length of stay of nine days, down from 33 days.
- A cost for community custody intervention of \$19.59 per day compared to a prior cost of \$96.37 per day for secure detention.
- A recidivism rate of 13 percent, down from 46 percent.<sup>84</sup>

**New Jersey** has also experienced success in reducing the number of juveniles held in detention. In just over two years of detention and child welfare reforms, the number of juveniles held in detention in some counties dropped sharply. The reductions range from an 11 percent drop in Atlantic County to a 43 percent drop in Essex County.<sup>85</sup>

## Changes to detention for young people who are arrested are beginning in New York State

### Upstate reforms catch troubled youth early and redirect them.

The Vera Institute's Center on Youth Justice is very active in detention reform. They report on their website that:

Vera has already provided technical assistance to those three counties and New York City and reforms are being set in place. Other counties are also interested. Vera held a symposium on juvenile detention reform in February of 2007, and top officials from 15 New York Counties attended.

New York State's Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) has contracted with the Center to offer a program geared toward reducing reliance on detention for court-involved youth, shortening detention lengths of stay, and providing more sound outcomes for young people and their families in the community. As part of this project, we are providing strategic planning assistance to three upstate New York counties—Onondaga (Syracuse), Erie (Buffalo) and Albany—and New York City.<sup>86</sup>

### The goal: not just fewer kids locked up, but fewer kids committing crimes

The goals are not simply to cut the number of kids in detention or custody as a cost-saving measure, or to give juveniles who committed real crimes an easier time prior to trial. One goal is to keep kids who should not be in the court system out of it. The other goal is to cut crime by ensuring that serious young offenders receive the interventions proven to turn many of them away from becoming career criminals. Reducing the warehousing of young people, especially prior to trial, can be an important part of efforts to cut crime if reduced costs help fund interventions for more troubled teens to keep them from harming more people.

Though these efforts often require significant funding, they are far cheaper than placing juveniles back in custody. And if done effectively, they will save communities millions of dollars by keeping more juveniles from becoming adult career criminals.

## RE-ENTRY AFTER CUSTODY: reviewing what works

Too often, when juveniles return to their communities after being held in custody they return to their old ways. Of teens committed to state juvenile custody, 75 percent are re-arrested within three years.<sup>87</sup> This report has already discussed in various sections what can help young offenders in custody to re-enter their communities without committing more crimes.

### Key conclusions:

#### High-Risk Young Offenders

For the young offenders at highest-risk of committing violent crimes who are leaving custody, intensive carrot-and-stick approaches are needed. They combine intensive law enforcement supervision with severe sanctions if necessary, as well as intensive social support and services to get these juveniles on the right path. This approach has repeatedly shown it can save lives.

#### Juveniles Without Stable Families

For juveniles in custody who do not have stable families to return to, Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC) can provide a step down approach. For six to 12 months, specially trained foster parents teach the young people social skills and attitudes to help them avoid crime. At the same time, the juvenile's parents are being carefully trained to take over and follow the same system of close supervision when their child returns home.

#### Other Youths Returning Directly Home

Other delinquents returning directly home may need Functional Family Therapy (FFT) or Multisystemic Therapy (MST) in order to ensure they learn more productive patterns of behavior that will keep them from recycling repeatedly through the juvenile and adult criminal justice systems.

#### Substance-Abusing Youths

Finally, for substance-abusing youth, assertive follow-up is needed. For a juvenile who received drug treatment in custody, assertive follow-up upon release, such as provided by the Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach (ACRA), can help ensure that relapses—which are common—do not cause a juvenile to abandon efforts to stay clean.

## Measuring repeat offending and using it to guide decisions

As the New York City Police Department has shown with its CompStat data collection and response system, careful collection and use of data can help reduce crimes. Across the United States, the collection and use of repeat offending data on young offenders and adults is often far from adequate, and New York State has its own challenges in trying to coordinate New York City data collection systems with upstate data systems. It is essential to break through legal, bureaucratic, and funding challenges that hinder the effective collection of repeat offending data at the city, county and statewide levels. The next step is to use the data to hold facilities and programs accountable for producing better results. Better data will produce better policies. Two states are pioneers in doing this:

### Washington

Washington has excellent statewide data available on repeat crimes. The Washington State Institute for Public Policy, a legislative-sponsored agency under the leadership of Steve Aos, produced a truly exceptional cost-benefit study of interventions that reduce juvenile crime and other problem outcomes.<sup>88</sup> The Institute analyzed more than 3,000 interventions from around the country that reduced crime and produced a cost-benefit analysis. The state has used the analysis as a guide for choosing effective interventions. The Institute then studied the results of those interventions and tested whether they worked in Washington State or not, and why. For example, its tracking found that FFT counselors who were well qualified cut repeat crimes sharply among the juvenile delinquents they served, but unqualified FFT counselors actually increased repeat crimes among the delinquents they served compared to delinquents in a control group receiving another intervention. Based on that evidence, the state legislature took the Institute's advice and now requires strong new quality-control measures in all its juvenile justice interventions for delinquents. The Institute continues to track repeat crime rates among the participants in the various interventions it has convinced the state to adopt. Aos and his team have thus developed a sophisticated continuous-improvement process that uses data and science to help the state save money and cut crime.

### Florida

Florida has also developed a statewide system to mon-

itor the repeat crime rates of all its juveniles and adults who were held in custody.

Florida has a statewide risk-assessment used for each young offender based on their individual criminal and social history. (In New York, upstate counties are using the YASI tool and New York City will be using its own RAI tool).<sup>89</sup> Using their common risk-assessment information, Florida is able to give each facility or intervention program a report on the level of risks the juveniles in their care have for committing more crimes when they leave. Then, the statewide system has the capability to track the actual crimes committed by persons leaving those facilities or programs. This allows Florida to provide ongoing feedback to each institution. Programs can look at the risk-level of the youths they are serving and the crimes being committed by those youths when they are released and assess whether the program's efforts are meeting reasonable expectation for reducing future crime. In extreme cases, ineffective facilities or programs will be closed down and the youths transferred to more effective institutions where better crime prevention results are more likely.<sup>90</sup>

Developing a similar system will be challenging in New York because New York City does not share much crime data with the state. The latest available state-wide analysis of re-arrests for juveniles leaving state custody is from 1999.

## Cutting Crime Saves Money


The average cost statewide in New York for placing youth in custody following trial for an average period of confinement of 10 months is \$125,000 per youth.<sup>99</sup> By contrast, the State University of New York reports that its typical expenses for tuition room and board are about \$17,000 a year.<sup>100</sup> While reducing crime among juvenile delinquents will require some initial up-front investments in interventions that work, reducing the number of youths held in detention pretrial or in custody following trial can immediately produce savings. For example, New York City reported that, in 2005, it saved \$18 million in payments to the state juvenile justice agency, OCFS, in part by reducing placements of youth in OCFS custody.<sup>101</sup>

Florida found that during two years of redirecting 405 youth from county residential delinquency programs to MST or FFT community-based programs the state saved \$5.8 million by avoiding the extra costs of out-of-home placements.<sup>102</sup> DuPage County Illinois has also used MST and FFT to cut its out-of-home placement costs from \$3 million a year in the mid-1990s to \$1 million in 2005.<sup>103</sup>

But the real test of whether reforms produce long-term savings — or actually end up costing society more — will be whether the interventions successfully reduce repeat crimes. Each high-risk juvenile prevented from adopting a life of crime could save the country between \$1.7 million and \$2.3 million. And, the researchers who provide cost of crime estimates to the Justice Department have concluded that criminal justice costs alone in New York total over \$4 billion every year.<sup>104</sup> Florida found that, when its MST and FFT programs were implemented as planned, they reduced repeat arrests by 45 percent (FFT in Broward County) and by 48 percent (MST in Escambia County). The MST program in Escambia County also cut felony arrests by 64 percent.<sup>105</sup> Florida has not yet added the savings from reduced crime into its \$5.8 million reported savings, but Ohio did have projections for both reductions in custody and future crime costs.

Ohio's RECLAIM effort cut custody costs — on average \$28,000 per juvenile — by reassigning moderate-risk young offenders to community sanctions with strict interventions. In addition, Ohio found RECLAIM produced an average of \$19,000 in savings per youth from reductions in future crime committed by the juveniles in the program. Total savings from reduced custody costs and lower crime costs averaged \$47,000 per moderate-risk juvenile re-directed to community interventions.

Steve Aos and his team at the Washington Institute for Public Policy further confirmed that impressive savings



are possible in a report released October, 2006. Typically, the studies Aos and his team looked at compared the new intervention with the services youth would regularly receive. Out of their comprehensive review of evaluations — his team originally looked at over 3,000 interventions — they produced a cost benefit analysis. Many interventions tested did not produce reductions in repeat crimes or savings, and a few, such as Scared Straight, made things worse. Far too often, good intentions were not enough. But Aos and his team found that some well-tested interventions delivered very strong results, as the table below shows.

These proven interventions reduced repeat crimes so effectively that they saved taxpayers and victims an average of from \$15,000 to over \$75,000 for each young offender served. In addition to the public safety imperative to better protect our communities, there is also a fiscal imperative to doing so.

## Next steps in New York

An effective juvenile justice system must meet three objectives:

- Ensure the safety of the community.
- Hold youths accountable.
- Enable youths to become capable, productive, responsible citizens.

The 300-plus members of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids New York are convinced reform is necessary to keep juveniles from committing more crimes. Fortunately, reform is already happening in many places and in many different ways. The following reforms are needed to

reduce crime:

**1. Ensure that juvenile delinquents at high-risk of committing violent crimes are held in facilities that are better designed and staffed in order to teach them how to avoid more crime.**

Missouri is one model for how to achieve this. Many facilities in New York City and upstate are already reasonably sized, but more needs to be done to ensure that they are following successful approaches that include training or hiring new staff so they can change, not just warehouse, troubled juveniles.

**2. Provide special treatment for juveniles in custody with serious mental health problems.**

Wisconsin has had success in doing this. Wisconsin's example is promising but this is an area where more research and changes are needed to ensure New York adopts the right approaches to work with juvenile delinquents who have severe mental problems. The high number of homicides committed by troubled offenders leaving custody who had not received a mental health intervention in Wisconsin demonstrates clearly why effective efforts with this special population are necessary.

**3. Make sure that the most dangerous juveniles are included in carrot-and-stick efforts that provide increased supervision, expedited return to custody if necessary, and expedited access to jobs and substance abuse treatment.**

David Kennedy, the researcher behind the initial effort in Boston who is now at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, is advising communities throughout the country, including Nassau, Orange, and Westchester counties in New York. He is helping them to form teams that can do a better job of dealing with the juveniles and young

What reduces crime saves money <sup>130</sup>	Savings or costs per participant				
	Costs avoided by crime victims <sup>131</sup>	Savings to taxpayers from crime reduction only <sup>132</sup>	Program Costs	Net savings to taxpayers	Net savings to taxpayers and victims
Functional Family Therapy for youth on probation (FFT)	\$19,529	\$14,617	\$2,325	\$12,292	\$31,821
Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST)	\$12,855	\$9,622	\$4,264	\$5,358	\$18,213
Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (v. regular group care) (MTFC) <sup>133</sup>	\$51,828	\$32,915	\$6,945	\$25,970	\$77,798
Aggression Replacement Training (ART)	\$8,897	\$6,659	\$897	\$5,762	\$14,660

Washington State Institute for Public Policy 10/06

## Juvenile Justice Reforms in New York City

### PINS Reforms

**PINS reforms:** By using earlier assessments of youths who were truant, running away, or otherwise out-of-control of their parents – and diverting more of them away from juvenile courts to community services – New York City has cut the number of court cases in half and reduced out-of-home placements by 25 percent.<sup>91</sup>

### Pre-trial Detention Reforms

**Pre-trial detention reforms:** In addition to better handling of PINS offenses, New York City is working with the Vera Institute of Justice to develop a new screening instrument, the RAI, and to develop a continuum of options for placing fewer youths in detention pre-trial. For example, the city is already beginning to set up reporting centers where many youths awaiting trial will report in after school and receive services in lieu of being detained while awaiting trial. New York City expects to have its risk assessment and detention reforms up and running city-wide by the end of the year.<sup>92</sup>

### Family-Based Drug Treatment

**Family-Based Drug Treatment for Juveniles:** the Vera Institute of Justice is testing a new program in New York City that “treats the heaviest substance users in their homes and elsewhere in the community [rather than in custody] and intimately involves their primary caregivers in the treatment process.” It provides family counseling and behavior support. Vera reports that “initial findings are encouraging,” but longer-term results are not yet available.<sup>93</sup>

### Enhanced Supervision Process

**Enhanced Supervision Process:** The Department of Probation has a program to “divert serious cases from [state custody] when the youths do not pose a threat to community safety, but where general probation supervision appears likely to be insufficient.” The probation officers have fewer cases, meet more often with the young offenders, work closely with schools, and there is “wrap-around” funding to provide additional support services when needed.<sup>94</sup> Savings are already being realized through reduced custody costs.<sup>95</sup> Adequate data collection and analysis is needed to ensure this promising approach is indeed saving money by reducing future crime.

adults in their communities who are most likely to kill or be killed.

### 4. Place many medium-security juveniles who need to be removed from their homes in intensive foster care homes instead of custody.

New York City has 30 intensive foster care homes and there are 20 more upstate. But there are beds for over 500 youths in group care facilities in the state. Many of the youths held in those facilities would be half as likely to commit more crimes if they were placed in intensive foster homes instead. The citizens of New York could eventually save an average of \$77,000 per youth from reduced crime.

### 5. Place other young offenders in court-ordered family therapy.

There are already 13 counties in New York using

### Esperanza

**Esperanza:** the Vera Institute of Justice is helping to reduce the number of juveniles in state custody by providing them and their families with family therapy and crisis management. Over four to six months, counselors provide home visits and counseling and are available in emergencies around the clock. They help families institutionalize house rules and rewards and consequences and ensure that youths receive educational assessments and services. Preliminary indications are promising, but final results of evaluations are not yet available.<sup>96</sup>

### Juvenile Justice Initiative

**Juvenile Justice Initiative (JJI):** The Administration for Children’s Services, which handles child welfare cases, is working with the Family Courts to divert youths from placement and custody with the State, if possible, to three of the proven family therapy programs we cite in this report: MST, FFT, and MTFC. Nine million dollars have already been directed to this effort and it currently serves 200 youth but it is expected to continue growing to serve 380 youth a year. Although these are proven programs, data should be systematically collected to ensure they are being implemented with fidelity.<sup>97</sup>

### Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care

**Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC):** Along with the MTFC programs being implemented as part of the JJI effort above, Cayuga Home for Children, an experienced provider, is currently serving 30 juveniles in treatment foster homes in the Bronx.<sup>98</sup>

Functional Family Therapy and 17 counties that already are or soon will be using Multisystemic Therapy. But the other counties should adopt these interventions, and the counties that already have them should ensure they are reaching all who need them.

**6. Whether juveniles are in custody or not, ensure they receive effective interventions if needed to address their problems with aggression or substance abuse.**

Aggression Replacement Training was tested in New York and found to be effective, but it is still not routinely available for most aggressive youths in the juvenile justice system. And while many youths receive drug treatment through the juvenile justice system, many more need it. Those who are receiving drug treatment are less likely to stay clean unless they receive active follow-up programs such as the Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach.

**7. Provide safe alternatives to pretrial detention for most first-time and low-level offenders.**

New York City and many counties in New York are already reforming how they handle PINS youth who are truant, running away or beyond the control of their families and clogging up the juvenile court systems. The PINS reforms are saving money that should be captured and re-directed to interventions for young people more likely to commit more crimes or violent crimes. But more reforms for other low-level and first-time offenders such as the evening centers discussed above are needed to reduce the number of youths held in expensive pre-trial detention.

**8. When juveniles return to their communities following custody, ensure that they receive the interventions for aggression, family functioning, substance abuse and other supports they will need to stay crime-free.**

If more is not done throughout the state to expand access to effective programs that help youths returning from custody, too many youth will continue to be a danger to their community.

**9. Systematically collect juvenile and adult arrest data and use it to hold programs accountable for reducing crime.**

New legislation and new policies must be adopted to ensure that juvenile and adult arrest data is being shared between New York City and the state and that it is being analyzed. Effective data collection is the first step in holding facilities and programs accountable for reducing crime.

Six counties in the state and New York City have begun efforts to adopt successful comprehensive reforms similar to RECLAIM Ohio. New York State already has extensive

experience in implementing FFT, MST and treatment foster care programs. And both Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Governor Eliot Spitzer have voiced strong commitments to juvenile justice reform. But to more fully realize the enormous potential to reduce juvenile crime, and the adult crime that follows when chronic young offenders become adult criminals, major efforts will be needed, both to “prime the pump” with new investments in what works, and to redirect existing dollars more wisely into programs and services proven to work. This will take vision, courage, and hard work.

The most important recommendation for all policy-makers deciding how to invest wisely in crime prevention is probably the simplest: use science, data collection, and accountability to guide policy.

The members of Fight Crime: Invest in Kids New York are committed to supporting changes in state and local juvenile justice systems. They know that effective interventions will produce both huge savings and safer streets.

**"My son David was murdered at age 28 by a man who was his same age and was also born in New York City.**

**From an early age that person was constantly in trouble with the law. He was in juvenile custody and in and out of prison since he was 16.**

**During the trial there was never anyone in the court who was his family or friend.**

**I often wonder if during those early troubled years if he had been exposed to social and educational interventions his life, and of course David's, would have been different."**

— Carolee Brooks.

*Her son, David Brooks, was murdered at age 28 in 1991.*

# Examples of Scientifically-Tested

## Cognitive Behavior Therapies

for aggressive and/or substance abusing individuals:

### Aggression Replacement Training (ART)

At under \$1,000 per young offender, this is a relatively low-cost, 10 week CBT intervention that can be used fairly widely with many juveniles who have serious problems with aggression, whether they are on probation, in custody, or returning to their communities following custody. A test of ART with juvenile delinquents returning to their communities found that, within 6 months after release, juveniles not receiving ART were almost 3 times more likely to be re-arrested for a crime (43 percent vs. 15 percent). Young people in Brooklyn gangs without ART services had 4 times the number of arrests of similar young gang members receiving ART (52 percent vs. 13 percent).<sup>106</sup> Tests of ART for delinquents in custody were also positive.<sup>107</sup> For more information on this program see:

<http://www.researchpress.com/product/item/5004/>

### Motivational Enhancement Therapy & Cognitive Behavior Therapy (MET/CBT)

This intervention is designed for outpatient substance abuse treatment and uses motivation techniques to first convince teen substance abusers they need treatment. Then cognitive behavior therapy is provided to give juveniles the beliefs and skills they will need to change their substance abusing behaviors. (Cognitive Behavior Therapy by itself has been shown to be less effective in reducing substance abuse.) MET/CBT produces results in randomized controlled trials that compare favorably with the results and the benefits per cost of family therapy for substance abuse. For more information on this program, see:

[http://www.chestnut.org/li/Bookstore/Blurbs/Manuals/CYT/CYT-vi-MET\\_CBT.html](http://www.chestnut.org/li/Bookstore/Blurbs/Manuals/CYT/CYT-vi-MET_CBT.html)

## Family therapies

to help manage seriously delinquent juveniles

### Functional Family Therapy (FFT)

This family therapy intervention has been successfully used for teens with serious delinquency, aggression and/or substance abuse problems who present a moderate to high-risk of re-offending. It is delivered over a period of 8 to 30 hours by trained providers. They range in background from paraprofessionals to mental health professionals. It costs \$2,000 per juvenile delinquent. In one study it cut re-arrests in half (26 percent vs. 50 percent) and in another study juveniles in the intervention were one-fourth as likely to be placed outside their home in juvenile justice custody, in a psychiatric placement, or in foster care (18 percent vs. 72 percent).<sup>108</sup> It can be used for youth on probation, in lieu of custody, or as support when youth return to their family after custody. For more information on this program see:

<http://www.fftinc.com/>

### Multisystemic Therapy (MST)

MST is a family therapy intervention for teens with moderate to high-risks of re-offending similar to FFT, though MST often serves some teens who are more serious or violent offenders than those served by FFT. It costs over \$5,000 for each youth and typically involves 60 hours of professional interventions over four months. The staff members are on call, if need be, around the clock. When properly implemented, MST shows strong results. One study followed-up the youth until they were an average of 29 years old. Individuals who had not received MST but were randomly assigned to receive individual therapy instead were 62 percent more likely to have been arrested for any criminal offense (81 percent vs. 50 percent), more than twice as likely to be arrested for a violent offense (30 percent vs. 14 percent), and more than twice as likely to be arrested for a drug offense (33 percent vs. 13 percent).<sup>110</sup> It can also be used for youth on probation, in lieu of custody, or as support when youth return to their family after custody. For more information on this program see:

<http://www.mstservices.com/>

# Interventions Shown to be Successful

## Family therapies

to help manage seriously delinquent juveniles (cont)

### Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care

This intervention is a longer-term, 6 to 12 month, family therapy intervention that can be used for seriously offender youth who would otherwise be placed out-of-home in group facilities. It involves carefully selecting and training foster parents and training them to tightly manage the youth's behavior. The youth are also taught to better control their behaviors. While the youth are in the foster parent's custody, their parents or guardian receive training so they can also tightly manage their child's behavior once they return home. It costs \$2,500 more than typical group care. Research shows it successfully cut the average number of arrests per youth in half (2.6 arrests vs. 5.4 arrests) and six times as many of the boys in MTFC as boys in a group homes had successfully avoided any new arrest (41 percent vs. 7 percent).<sup>111</sup> MTFC can also be used for youth returning to their communities from custody if they do not have a stable family to return to. For more information on this program see:

<http://www.mtfc.com/>

### Brief Strategic Family Therapy (BSFT)

BSFT is a family therapy intervention aimed at reducing a youth's drug use and conduct disorder. A randomized clinical trial of BSFT found that 66 percent of youth in BSFT with conduct disorder (defiant and/or delinquent behavior) showed significant reductions in conduct disorder-related problem behaviors, while youth in group counseling saw no reduction. Additionally, youth in BSFT who used drugs were 3.5 times more likely to show significant reductions in drug use than youth in group counseling who used drugs.<sup>112</sup> For more information on this program see:

<http://www.brief-strategic-family-therapy.com/bsft>

### Adolescent Community Reinforcement Approach (ACRA)

ACRA is a behavioral and family therapy intervention for adolescents, which focuses on getting them to change their environment so they are surrounded with pro-social activities, instead of activities and friends who lead them back into drug abuse. A study was conducted of ACRA as an active effort to follow-up youth who had completed residential treatment for substance abuse. ACRA was compared to what usually happens when youth leave a treatment intervention: they are told to find follow-up support and are given some phone numbers, but continuing care is not assertively provided to them. Three months after leaving treatment, youth receiving active continuing care with ACRA were 68 percent more likely to abstain from further marijuana use (52 percent vs. 31 percent).<sup>113</sup> For more information on this program see:

<http://www.chestnut.org/li/Bookstore/Blurbs/Manuals/CYT/CYT-v4-ACRA.html>

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> New York City has not been reporting juvenile arrest data since 2001. Data from 2001 shows there were 56,843 arrests of juveniles in New York State: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. (2004). 2000–2001 Crime and Justice Annual Report. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2006: [http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/cja\\_00\\_01/sec2.pdf](http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/cja_00_01/sec2.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Rice, E., (2006). 2005 Annual Report: Division of Rehabilitative Services. New York State Office of Children and Family Services. There were 2,453 youth in out-of-home custody through the Office of Children and Family Services in 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Frederick, B. (1999). Factors contributing to recidivism among youth placed with the New York State Division for Youth, Albany, New York, Office of Justice Analysis, Division of Criminal Justice Services. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2006: [http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dfy/dfy\\_research\\_report.pdf](http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dfy/dfy_research_report.pdf)

<sup>4</sup> For a comparison of many re-arrest rates around the country, see Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice, (April 2005). Juvenile recidivism in Virginia, in DJJ research Quarterly. Retrieved from the internet on February 16, 2007: at [http://www.djj.virginia.gov/Resources/DJJ\\_Publications/research\\_quarterlies.cfm?q=juvenile%20Recidivism%20in%20Virginia](http://www.djj.virginia.gov/Resources/DJJ_Publications/research_quarterlies.cfm?q=juvenile%20Recidivism%20in%20Virginia).

The New York rate for 12 months is high, but so are the rates for a number of other states.

<sup>5</sup> The Correctional Association of New York. (December 2006). Youth Confined in OCFs Facilities. Retrieved October 6, 2006: [http://www.correctionalassociation.org/JJP/publications/Youth\\_in\\_OCFs.pdf#search=22%20Youth%20Confined%20in%20OCFS%20facilities%22%22](http://www.correctionalassociation.org/JJP/publications/Youth_in_OCFs.pdf#search=22%20Youth%20Confined%20in%20OCFS%20facilities%22%22)

<sup>6</sup> Hernandez, N., Department of Juvenile Justice brief, retrieved Oct. 17: [http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/\\_mnr/dji.pdf](http://www.nyc.gov/html/ops/downloads/pdf/_mnr/dji.pdf)

<sup>7</sup> Tuition and room & board is \$16,880 for the 2006-07 school year. State University of New York. (2007). 2006-07 Typical expenses for undergraduate students at a SUNY college. Retrieved Jul. 12, 2007: [http://www.suny.edu/Student/paying\\_tuition.cfm](http://www.suny.edu/Student/paying_tuition.cfm)

Children's Safety Network Economics and Data Analysis Resource Center, (2007). Cost of Crime in New York. This more recent work by Ted Miller and his team is based on the analysis done in Miller, T.; Cohen, M.; & Wiersema, B. (1996). Victim costs and consequences: A new look, National Institute of Justice, United States Department of Justice. The total costs in New York in 2004, including lost future earnings, medical costs, mental health costs, property damage, public programs, criminal justice, and also quality of life calculations totaled over \$28 billion dollars for New York. This data was provided in a personal communication with Dexter Taylor of the Resource Center, Oct. 25, 2007.

<sup>8</sup> Snyder, H., & Sickmund, M. (2006). Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

<sup>9</sup> New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services. (2004). 2000 - 2001 Crime and Justice Annual Report. Ret Oct. 6, 2006: [http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/cja\\_00\\_01/sec2.pdf](http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/cja_00_01/sec2.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> Personal communication with Mary Skidmore the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) on September 6, 2006. The figures she supplied are from (OCFS), Juvenile Detention Automation System. 2001 data reported as of 8-29-06; and the New York City Department of Juvenile Justice. Youth Population Overview: (FY2005). Retrieved from the internet on August 18, 2006

<sup>11</sup> Snyder, H., & Sickmund, M. (2006). *Juvenile offenders and victims: 2006 national report*. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.

<sup>12</sup> Frederick, B. (1999). Factors contributing to recidivism among youth placed with the New York State Division for Youth, Albany, New York, Office of Justice Analysis, Division of Criminal Justice Services. Retrieved October 6, 2006: [http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dfy/dfy\\_research\\_report.pdf](http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dfy/dfy_research_report.pdf)

<sup>13</sup> Kennedy, D. M. (1999, May 23). A look at reacting to violence, but Boston proves something can be done. *The Washington Post*, p. B3.

<sup>14</sup> Zavlek, S. (August 2005). Planning Community-Based Facilities for Violent Juvenile Offenders as Part of a System of Graduated Sanctions. OJJDP Juvenile Justice Bulletin. Retrieved October 10, 2006 from: <http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/209326.pdf>

Mendel, D. (2003). *And The Walls Keep Tumbling Down*. Retrieved October 10, 2006 from <http://www.aecf.org/publications/advocasey/spring2003/pdf/walls.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Dennis Gragg, Assistant to Deputy of Director, Division of Youth Services, within the Missouri Department of Social Services, personal communication August 15, 2006. The recidivism rate of 37 percent presented here is based on information provided by Gragg on the return of youth to custody in the Missouri juvenile system combined with data on detention, probation, or incarceration in the adult system.

<sup>16</sup> The percentage difference formula is  $62\% - 37\% / 62\% = 40\%$ . The percentage point difference is  $62\% - 37\% = 25\%$ . Comparing recidivism rates that were collected in different states by different methods would be meaningless if the differences were small, due to all the extraneous factors that could influence the differences in rates. But the difference between the 37 percent rate for Missouri, (which has two large cities with high crime rates), and the 62 percent rate for New York State likely indicate an important difference in the real levels of recidivism between the two states. This, coupled with the respect juvenile justice professionals have for the Missouri system, help solidify our conclusion that Missouri is a model that should be studied by New York officials when reforms are being considered. For the recidivism rate for New York State, see: Frederick, B. (1999). Factors contributing to recidivism among youth placed with the New York State Division for Youth, Albany, New York, Office of Justice Analysis, Division of Criminal Justice Services. Retrieved October 6, 2006 from: [http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dfy/dfy\\_research\\_report.pdf](http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dfy/dfy_research_report.pdf)

<sup>17</sup> Dr. Gregory Van Rybroek, Director, Mendota Juvenile Treatment Center, personal communication on August 8, 2006.

<sup>18</sup> Caldwell, M., Vitacco, M., & Van Rybroek, G. (2006). Are Violent Delinquents Worth Treating? A Cost-Benefit Analysis. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 43(2), 148-168.

<sup>19</sup> Caldwell, M., Vitacco, M., & Van Rybroek, G. (2006). Are Violent Delinquents Worth Treating? A Cost-Benefit Analysis. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 43(2), 148-168.

<sup>20</sup> Papachristos, A.V. (2006). Strategies for Reducing Gang and Gun Violence: Findings From Project Safe Neighborhoods Cities. Presentation given at "The NJ Conference 2006", July 17-19, 2006, Washington D.C.

<sup>21</sup> The researchers also looked at other possible causes of the sharp drop in homicides, specifically at surveillance cameras which were introduced later in the process in both communities, and the anti-gang education effort, Project Ceasefire (which was also modeled after Boston but without a strong "stick" component). Ceasefire had been operating for years in many troubled Chicago neighborhoods. Neither the timing of the introduction of the cameras nor the presence of Ceasefire coincided as precisely as the implementation of offender notification meetings with the sharp drop in homicides in the targeted neighborhoods. It should be noted that Chicago's Ceasefire efforts were included in many of the PSN offender notification meeting efforts. So Ceasefire may have been a necessary, but not sufficient part of what worked with the PSN efforts. Papachristos, A.V., Meares, T.L., & Fagan, J. (November 2005). Attention felons: Evaluating Project Safe Neighborhood in Chicago, Chicago, John M. Olin Law & Economics Workin Paper No. 269. <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/wp251-300.html>. The figure of 18% reductions in homicides during the same period in the control neighborhood was provided by Andrew Papachristos, the lead author, in a personal communication, October 9, 2006.

<sup>22</sup> McGarrell, E.F., Chermak, S., Wilson, J.M., & Corsaro, N. (2006). Reducing Homicide through a "Lever-Pulling" Strategy. *Justice Quarterly*, 23(2), 214-231.

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<sup>119</sup> Alexander, J., Pugh, C., Parsons, B., & Sexton, T. (2000). Family Functional Therapy. In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.), Blueprints for violence prevention: Book three. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.

<sup>120</sup> Alexander, J., Pugh, C., Parsons, B., & Sexton, T. (2000). Family Functional Therapy. In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.), Blueprints for violence prevention: Book three. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.

<sup>121</sup> The 17 counties and New York City where there are or soon will be sites are: Albany, Allegany, Cattaraugus, Cayuga, Chautauqua, Erie, Monroe, Nassau, Niagara, Onandoga, Ontario, Seneca, Suffolk, Tompkins, Ulster, Westchester, Tayoga, and New York City. This is based on a conversation with Ed Hayes, certified trainer for MST, Cayuga Home for Children, Auburn NY, personal commu-

nication August 24, 2006; and on a search of websites for Catholic Charities, Cayuga Home for Children, Children's Village, Coordinated Children Services, Liberty Resources, and Rehabilitation Support Services. For example, Children's Village has been doing MST since 2000 in all 5 boroughs plus Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties with a total of 575 slots.

<sup>122</sup> Schaeffer, C.M., & Borduin, C.M. (2005). Long-term follow-up to a randomized clinical trial of Multisystemic Therapy with serious and violent juvenile offenders. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 73(3), 445-453

<sup>123</sup> Schaeffer, C.M., & Borduin, C.M. (2005). Long-term follow-up to a randomized clinical trial of Multisystemic Therapy with serious and violent juvenile offenders. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 73(3), 445-453

<sup>124</sup> Chamberlain, P., & Mihalic, S.F. (1998). Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care. In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.), Blueprints for violence prevention: Book eight. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.

<sup>125</sup> Ed Hayes, CEO of Cayuga Home for Children, Auburn NY, who helped set up the MTFC programs in New York City and in Central New York, personal communication August 24, 2006, and August 7, 2007.

<sup>126</sup> Chamberlain, P., & Mihalic, S.F. (1998). Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care. In D.S. Elliot (Series Ed.), Blueprints for violence prevention: Book eight. Boulder, CO: Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence.

<sup>127</sup> Santisteban, D.A., Coatsworth, J.D., Perez-Vidal, A., Kurtines, W.M., Schwartz, S.J., LaPerriere, A., et al. (2003). Efficacy of Brief Strategic Family Therapy in modifying Hispanic adolescent behavior problems and substance use. Journal of Family Psychology, 17(1), 121-133.

<sup>128</sup> Santisteban, D.A., Coatsworth, J.D., Perez-Vidal, A., Kurtines, W.M., Schwartz, S.J., LaPerriere, A., et al. (2003). Efficacy of Brief Strategic Family Therapy in modifying Hispanic adolescent behavior problems and substance use. Journal of Family Psychology, 17(1), 121-133.

<sup>129</sup> Dennis, M. (November 2005). State of the Art of Treating Adolescent Substance Use Disorders: Course, Treatment System, and Evidence Based Practices. Presentation given at the "2005 State Adolescent Coordinators (SAC) Grantee Orientation Meeting", November 28-30, 2005, Baltimore, MD. Lipsey, M. W. (1997). What can you build with thousands of bricks? Musings on the cumulation of knowledge in program evaluation. New Directions for Evaluation, 76, 7-23.

<sup>130</sup> Aos, S., Miller, M., & Drake, E. (October 2006). Evidence-based public policy options to reduce future prison construction, criminal justice costs, and crime rates. Olympia, WA. Washington State Institute for Public Policy retrieved from [www.wsipp.wa.gov](http://www.wsipp.wa.gov)

<sup>131</sup> This includes tangible losses due to medical costs, lost earnings etc. but also pain, suffering and reduced quality of life estimates for different crimes developed by Miller et al. for the National Institute of Justice. The intangible costs are based on jury verdicts and other measures. This attempts to take account of the reality that a rape usually causes more suffering to an individual than a burglary or robbery, even though the tangible costs may be similar. See: Miller, T.R., Cohen, M.A., & Wiersema, B. (February 1996). Victim costs and consequences: A new look. Washington, D.C., National Institute of Justice.

<sup>132</sup> This is based on police, court, and jail or prison costs in Washington State. Aos, S., Miller, M., & Drake, E. (October 2006). Evidence-based public policy options to reduce future prison construction, criminal justice costs, and crime rates. Olympia, WA. Washington State Institute for Public Policy retrieved from [www.wsipp.wa.gov](http://www.wsipp.wa.gov)

<sup>133</sup> The costs for MTFC are marginal costs above what would already be spent. Because all juveniles eligible for the MTFC program were to be placed out-of-home, the cost of MTFC reported here is only the additional cost beyond what it would cost to place the juvenile offenders in a group home.

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